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Abstract
Having a child out of wedlock used to be associated with shame and scorn. This 
is mostly not the case anymore in the western world. Therefore, freed from social 
sanctions, single motherhood has become an additional family-choice alternative for 
women, along with marriage and childlessness. Yet, the institutions that inﬂ  uence 
women’s decisions diﬀ  er across countries. We compare the institutional frame, in 
particular labor-market characteristics and family law, in Germany and Japan and, in 
addition, the interaction between culture and institutions. Both countries had a very 
traditional (one-earner) family system until the second half of the 20th century. Now 
we can observe that social changes that happened in Germany decades ago are hap-
pening only now in Japan. We analyze if and how the consequences in terms of family 
structures and fertility rates that resulted in Germany can be transfered to Japan.
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During the last decade the Japanese society has faced a number of major
institutional changes. On the one hand, the labor market has lost its inherent
structure that formerly saw employees working for their whole lifespan for
the same employer – virtually without the possibility of being ﬁred. Now,
temporary employment and long-term unemployment are almost as prevalent
as they are in other western countries.
Also in the realm of family law reforms have taken place: a 2007 change
in pension law has made divorce more attractive for women. In fact, as they
are now entitled to a share in some cases as big as half of their spouse’s
pension, divorce has just begun to be a real option for many women.
At the same time, the lives of women have changed dramatically in the
last two decades, and they are still changing. A lot of those changes are
similar to those that happened in Germany many decades ago.
More and more women gain access to higher education – in 2007, 40%
of students enrolled in university were women, as opposed to 22% in 1980
(Statistics Bureau of Japan (2008)).
At the same time fertility rates are decreasing, with 2005 and 2007 be-
ing the ﬁrst years since data-gathering began in which Japan experienced a
natural population decline (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2009))
Special attention is directed at a group of younger women who are well ed-
ucated and full-time employed and still stay with their parents. Although
these women are high-proﬁle consumers and therefore make a major con-
tribution to the Japanese economy, they are often referred to as ”parasite
singles” because they neither marry nor reproduce but ”exploit” their par-
ents. One reason for this pointed view is the fear that Japan’s already low
fertility rate might further drop.
Another phenomenon that has until recently been virtually inexistent
in Japan is lone parenthood. In 2005 5.6% of all households were headed
by a lone mother (Statistics Bureau of Japan (2009)). Of those, most are
divorced mothers. The proportion of non-marital births in Japan is only
1.6% (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (2004)).
Divorce in Japan implies sole custody for one of the parents. Yet, based
on the parasite-single experience, intended lone motherhood could be a new
choice for Japanese women.
These numbers resemble the situation in Germany 30 to 40 years ago.
The mechanism that tried to keep women as non-working housewives and
4mothers were structurely the same: A male-centered labor market, poor
ﬁnancial rights to women – that were, in addition, also poorly enforceable –
and stigma put on working women. Yet, in Germany it was not the parasite
(childless) single but the working mother who was in the focus of abuse. She
was – and quite often still is – referred to as a raven mother, an expression
that is only known in Germany and is intended to single out the self-centered,
irresponsible mother who lets her dependent children down by entrusting
them to a nanny or a public day-care center.
Following a major change in the labor market in the 1950s and 1960s when
Germany’s economy boomed, female labor-market participation slightly in-
creased and family and divorce law changed such that unwed motherhood
is now common and about 18% of all German households with dependent
children are single-headed. Based on the similarities between both initial po-
sitions we ask if the German experience can help us to predict the Japanese
future. To answer that question we describe the institutions that are decisive
in marriage and fertility decisions of Japanese and German women. To that
end we sketch a theoretical model of the relationship between institutions
and marriage and fertility decisions and derive a set of hypotheses on the
direction of eﬀects of diﬀerent institutions. We then apply those hypotheses
to Japanese and German institutions.
2 A theoretical perspective
An institutional analysis of (female) family decision making needs to be
rooted in some theoretical considerations of the issue. In what follows we
will shortly survey the literature on unwed and lone motherhood and pro-
vide a model that connects fertility decisions to a number of institutional
factors.
While family related decisions in general have been intensely discussed
within economic models since the seminal work by Becker (1981), the ques-
tion of unwed motherhood started to be in the centre of attention much later.
Whereas earlier work attached out-of-wedlock childbearing to social welfare
payments (see Moﬃtt (1997) for a literature overview), Rosenzweig (1999)
provides a theoretical analysis that models unwed motherhood as one of a set
of choices women face in a more general setting. He assumes that a woman
chooses rationally between three alternatives: remaining single and child-
less, marrying and having children, and becoming a single mother. Willis
5(1999) enriches this model and incorporates the possibility of child support
payments into a marriage-market equilibrium. Based on this idea Del Boca
(2003), Del Boca and Ribero (1998), and Del Boca and Ribero (2001) have
built and compared models for child support and visitation rights as bargain-
ing outcomes between mother and father.
Only recently family decisions (and within that framework the decision
for unwed motherhood) have been addressed in a more general framework,
for instance by Bj¨ orklund (2006), Edlund (2006), and Korn (2007) who show
that marriage and fertility decisions can be modeled as rational choices that
depend on a number of institutional factors. Laroque and Salani´ e (2008)
provide an empirical study that shows how fertility reacts to monetary in-
centives.
Our paper borrows from the general perspective on family decisions used
in Edlund (2006) and Korn (2007) and connects it to the comparison of
female motherhood options within and outside marriage by Willis (1999)
and Rosenzweig (1999). In particular, we provide a descriptive analysis of
institutional impacts on women’s decision to be a married mother, a lone
mother, or to stay childless (married or unmarried). Our main objective is
to provide a comparison between institutions that result from social policies
and long-term social values in Germany and Japan. However, to be able to
assess the impact of diﬀerent real-world institutions, we need to formulate at
least a sketch of a theoretical model of how we expect institutions to matter.
We assume that individuals derive utility from consumption, companion-
ship, leisure time, and children. The analysis to follow is based on a number
of general features of these goods and their provision in diﬀerent marital ar-
rangements. We start with a short description of these assumptions and turn
then to the female decision problem.
Consumption is measured by the income an individual has at her disposal,
where income sources we take into account are labor-market income, welfare
payments, intra-marital transfers, and alimony payments. Parents can be an
additional source of income (as mentioned in Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994)),
especially for very young mothers; but, as we do not want to address this
group in particular, we abstain from modeling this aspect.
Companionship is a ﬁxed outcome of marriage or cohabitation; yet, we
see that companionship also has a downside as togetherness also curbs in-
dividual freedom. The extent to which individuals are subjected to social
norms that limit individual freedom is hard to quantify. Therefore, we will
devote a paragraph to this issue when we discuss the eﬀects of institutions
6on individual decision making and wellbeing.
In our context, leisure time is time that is spent neither for labor-market
work nor for childcare. Thus, the amount of time that is left for leisure
depends on consumption needs as well as on the existence of children and
the childcare arrangements that are available (public institutions, sharing
between spouses, etc).
The most complex component of our utility model are children.F i r s to f
all, we assume that women have access to modern contraceptive technologies.
Thus, parenthood is voluntary and a purely female decision. In our model,
men are consultants only in the decision to become a mother. Of course a
woman’s utility from being a mother is inﬂuenced by her spouse’s consent in
the decision; yet, the ﬁnal decision is made by the woman.1 In addition, we
assume that the societies under consideration are libertine such that sexual
activity is not exclusively canalized through marriage.
Therefore, although women hold the ﬁnal decision power with respect to
fertility, men inﬂuence this decision in diﬀerent ways. They may provide
ﬁnancial support and time to an extent that depends on marital status and
legal and informal arrangements (the institutional frame); in addition, they
can be competitors in child consumption. These aspects interact in two ways:
On the one hand, children have aspects of private as well as public goods
to their parents. The public-good aspect includes biological parenthood
(genes of both parents are passed on to the next generation although men
may not recognize this aspect due to paternity uncertainty) which is indepen-
dent of marital arrangements and will not be considered here in any further
detail. In addition, there is public consumption to married or cohabiting
parents that is attached to time spent jointly with the child and from joint-
custody decisions. We assume that if a woman decides to be a lone mother
or if parents are divorced, there are almost no public aspects to the child. In
that case, all child consumption is private – which allows for the inclusion of
conﬂicts between parents concerning custody or visitation rights.
On the other hand, the costs of raising children also have public as well
as private aspects. Within marriage monetary and caring needs can be borne
by both parents whereas separated or never-married parents face diﬃculties
1We do not consider unwanted childlessness. If we allow for time-inconsistent prefer-
ences, ineﬃciently low fertility can result from biological reasons as well as bad planning
(see Wrede (2009)). In addition, as we are interested in modelling the transition from child-
lessness to motherhood, we will assume that a woman who decides to become a mother
will have exactly one child.
7in sharing these costs (at least as far as the use of time is concerned). In
addition, there might be support from society, for instance, if there is publicly
subsidized day care. We will address all these aspects when discussing the
eﬀect of marriage-related as well as child-related institutions.
The extent to which the four inputs (consumption, companionship, leisure
time, child) add to female utility depends on marital and motherhood status.
As we want to describe the eﬀect of marriage-market and child-support insti-
tutions on female decision making in two developed countries, we concentrate
on a special setting. First of all, we assume that marriages are consensual –
which is the case for the Japanese as well as the German society and is cru-
cial for all institutional considerations addressed in what follows. Second, we
concentrate on women as decision makers and include male decision making
by means of marriage-market constraints. Furthermore, we take education
levels as given and we assume that labor-market institutions are exogenous
and known to all individuals. That is, if married women or lone or married
mothers are able to work and which income is to be expected, can be assessed
by men and women when facing family decisions.
Based on these general assumptions we can now describe the female
decision-making process. We model marital status and motherhood as an
outcome of a sequential (partly interactive) decision process as depicted in
Figure 1. Within this framework we compare women’s utility in nodes 1 to
5 with a special emphasis on institutional aspects.
8Figure 1: Payoﬀ structure from female perspective
9Payoﬀs 1 to 5 are results of a series of individual decisions that are to be
made in decision nodes W1 to W6 for women and M1 for men.2
At each decision node women decide which path to take, taking into con-
sideration all information available to them at that moment. The inclusion
of the male decision node points to the existence of a marriage market. Al-
though we will not model the matching process on this market in detail, we
would like to stress a number of features of marriage markets that impact on
the likelihood of ﬁnding a spouse.
As is known from empirical studies, matching depends in a – positive or
negative – assortative way on personal characteristics of the spouses (see,
for instance, Becker (1981), chapter 4, and Lam (1988)). Within our mod-
elling framework the marriage-market impacts of education level and occu-
pational success are most important. We will therefore concentrate on these
two aspects on an aggregate level (i.e., their inﬂuence on likelihood of ﬁnd-
ing a spouse). Marriage markets in Germany and Japan are in principle
hypergamic, that is, men prefer to marry women with an equal or lower
education level and equal or lower income, whereas women prefer to marry
“up”. Within the institutional part we will address the eﬀect of labor-market
changes on this social rule.
Besides personal traits, features of the marriage contract itself have a
strong inﬂuence on outcomes of the matching process. If an individual is
willing to sign such a long-term contract depends on the rights and duties
resulting from the contract and the possibilities to terminate it. In particular
the question how custodial rights and alimony payments are arranged within
and outside marriage is to be addressed. To address these contractual ques-
tions, we also have to deﬁne the usage of the term ”marriage” in our model:
In most countries, in particular our focal countries Japan and Germany, there
is a third option between staying single and marrying, which is cohabiting.
Judicial systems treat cohabitation either similar to marriage or similar to
2The outcomes ”divorce” and ”no divorce” obviously also depend on the husband’s
decision. We assume that divorce can be obtained if one spouse wants it – which implies
that the decision ”divorce” can be made by the wife alone. However, ”no divorce” implies a
consensual process between husband and wife. To keep the analysis as simple as possible,
we subsume the case where the husband wants a divorce into payoﬀs 1 and 5. This
simpliﬁcation is noncritical for our analysis as long as child-support payments and other
details do not depend on the question of who has ﬁled the divorce. In addition, our model
is backed up by the fact that the majority of divorce cases are female driven (56% of all
German divorce cases in 2006 were female driven, Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland
(2008)).
10lone motherhood. Therefore, we use the dichotomy for sake of simplicity
and classify cohabitation as ”close to marriage” or ”close to staying single”
depending on institutional details.3
To prepare our discussion of the impact of institutional aspects on family-
related decisions, we address the payoﬀs in the decision tree in Figure 1 and
compare them in a backward-inductive way. Based on the outcome of the
marriage market (after nodes W1 and M1) a – single or now-married – woman
can choose between becoming a mother or staying childless.
If a woman decides not to enter the marriage market, the only remaining
decision is to stay single and childless (payoﬀ no. 1) or to become a lone
mother (payoﬀ no. 2). A married woman can later on decide to get divorced
or not. Thus, we get:
Payoﬀ No. 1:
If childless a woman’s utility is based on her consumption – ﬁnanced by
labor-market income – and leisure time, both of which are unrestricted by
child investments. The downside of this unlimited freedom is missing utility
from a spousal relationship or a child.
Payoﬀ No. 2:
A lone mother has consumption utility from her child which is a mainly pri-
vate good as explained above. Yet, the woman has to provide monetary and
caring resources for the child. As we have argued, sharing arrangements are
diﬃcult for separated parents. Thus, the extent to which the woman has
to share her private child consumption and can share her time and mon-
etary investment depends on visitation and custodial rights and duties an
unmarried father is entitled to. Institutional aspects determine how much
of a mother’s caring time for her child can be substituted by someone else’s
time. Important factors are the provision of public or free-market day-care
facilities, social norms concerning working mothers, and incentives to work
provided by welfare payments.
The latter two, through their impact on female labor-force participation,
also inﬂuence the woman’s monetary income and, thus, her and her child’s
consumption level. In addition, alimony rules and their enforcement (if the
father is known and has recognized the child) impact on the woman’s mone-
tary income. Similar to payoﬀ no. 1, a lone mother may face more individual
3In Germany, cohabitation steadily converges to marriage – which is mainly driven by
supreme-court decisions that are based on equal-treatment rights stated in the constitu-
tion. In Japan, cohabitation is virtually non-existing.
11freedom than a married mother but lacks support and companionship of a
spouse.
To compare payoﬀs 1 and 2 in her decision process, a woman has to assess
the trade-oﬀ between child consumption and the opportunity costs in form
of lost monetary income, leisure time, and labor-market opportunities.
Payoﬀ No. 3:
The consumption level of a married woman without children depends on in-
stitutions like social norms concerning working wives, the tax system, and the
(privately bargained as well as publicly inﬂuenced) rules of intra-household
income sharing. Once income splitting within marriages is accounted for,
married women without children face a similar situation as non-married
women without children except for the fact that they have exchanged in-
dividual freedom against companionship.
If a married childless woman decides on a divorce, her payoﬀ is even closer
to that of an unmarried woman. Marriage might entitle to alimony payments
after a divorce which could raise the woman’s income. We assume that the
payoﬀ of a divorced and an unmarried childless woman is the same.
Payoﬀ No. 4:
A married mother has utility from child consumption. In contrast to the
unwed mother, she enjoys the private- as well as the public-good aspects
of being a parent. Her monetary income and, thus, her consumption level
depend on social norms for working mothers (and child-caring fathers) as
well as on childcare facilities. In the latter aspect the married mother is
similar to the unwed mother. Yet, her time investment into the child can
more easily be substituted by father’s time but she might be more limited
in her access to publicly ﬁnanced day care. These aspects are part of the
institutional analysis to follow.
Payoﬀ No. 5:
A divorced mother is in a situation that is close to that of an unwed mother.
The main diﬀerence between both payoﬀs is that legal institutions might at-
tach a diﬀerent set of rights (visitation and custodial) and duties (alimony
payments for the mother and the child) to a divorced father. To compare
payoﬀs 2 and 5, a woman has to assess the trade-oﬀ between payments and
support in childcare from her husband during marriage and alimony pay-
ments afterwards on the one hand and social beneﬁts that are designed for
lone mothers only on the other hand. In a similar style she has to assess the
diﬀerence between payments and support from a husband to alimony pay-
ments from an ex-spouse and public support in childcare to compare payoﬀs
124 and 5. The exact trade-oﬀs depend on institutional arrangements.
3 An institutional perspective
Based on the payoﬀ structure derived in chapter 2, we can now turn to a
comparison of institutional arrangements in Germany and Japan. We address
the question which institutional arrangements inﬂuence payoﬀs 1 to 5 and
which changes are likely to induce transitions from one terminal node of the
decision tree to the other. To structure the considerations, we formulate a
set of seven hypotheses:4
1. Social beneﬁts can make transfers from men redundant and therefore
increase the incidence of divorce. This eﬀect is even stronger if beneﬁts
are exclusively paid to single mothers.
2. The more expensive a child in terms of direct costs and opportunity
costs, the lower fertility. Put the other way around, institutions that
decrease the cost of having a child increase fertility.
3. Favourable conditions on the labour market for women have an ambigu-
ous eﬀect. On the one hand, they increase opportunity costs of childrea-
ring and make childlessness more attractive. On the other hand, they
make men redundant and increase the incidence of divorce and single
motherhood. The income tax treatment of women’s earnings during
marriage has a similar eﬀect: The more a wife is allowed to keep, the
more likely she is to work more hours, and the more independent she
becomes.
4. Childcare facilities decrease opportunity costs of childrearing and in-
crease fertility, both within and out of wedlock.
5. Parental leave for fathers increases utility from marriage and reduces
the probability of divorce.
6. Child support from divorced fathers has the opposite eﬀect: it makes
divorce more attractive for mothers. But there is even an eﬀect at
an earlier stage: women, especially when slightly risk averse, are more
4A number of the hypotheses stated have been addressed in the studies mentioned
before. We (re)state them here to match the institutional setup we want to discuss.
13likely to decide in favor of having a child if they can expect child support
in case of divorce. Child support from never-married fathers increases
utility from out-of-wedlock motherhood. In the same style, shared cus-
tody increases the utility from single motherhood because costs in terms
of time can be shared and the woman has more leisure time available.
Furthermore, custodial fathers are more likely to invest directly in child
quality.
7. The more socially acceptable each option is, the more likely are women
to be working mothers, single mothers or childless. Social norms that
disapprove of working mothers decrease the attractiveness of mother-
hood within and out of wedlock for women who would like to work as
childlessness can be seen as a transition state while being a working
mother cannot. Fertility is likely to decline. A lack of acceptance of
single mothers decreases the payoﬀ of a divorced mother and in conse-
quence fertility.
Based on these hypotheses we will interpret institutions in Germany and
Japan and compare the predicted eﬀects with current trends in fertility and
marriage behavior in order to ﬁnd out which institutions seem to play an im-
portant part, and in how far the fertility and marriage decisions of Japanese
women are likely to mirror the ones made by German women in the past.
The information used in the paragraphs to follow is collected from OECD
sources, the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research in
Japan, the Statistical Bureau of Japan, and the DICE Database of CESifo.
3.1 Social beneﬁts
Social welfare beneﬁts or tax exemptions often depend on a woman’s family
situation (e.g. on whether she is a single mother), or on her income. In
particular, in the case of single mothers – whether divorced or never-married
– the role of social welfare is crucial. It is the main support if she can’t earn
enough income on the labor market to satisfy her consumption needs.
In both Germany and Japan, social welfare consists of unemployment in-
surance beneﬁts and social assistance. In Japan, unemployment beneﬁts are
paid for a maximum duration of 10 months, whereas in Germany they are
paid for 12 months. The amount of beneﬁts as percentage of previous earn-
ings is very similar in both countries, whereas in Japan maximum beneﬁts
14are capped at a much lower level. The amount of social assistance in both
Germany and Japan depends on the number of children in the household.
Despite a gradual increase of Japanese child beneﬁts over the past few
years, German beneﬁts are still much higher (4% of an average worker’s
income vs. 1% in Japan) and are also paid a lot longer: at least until the
child is 18, even longer if the child is still a student. In Japan, child beneﬁts
are only paid until the child is nine years old. Moreover, the Japanese beneﬁt
is means tested. Both countries have a child tax allowance.
All in all, parents in Germany receive higher beneﬁts which decreases the
opportunity cost of having a child in general, while support payments are
more targeted towards lone mothers in Japan. However, the overall level
of social welfare is rather low and the labor market is not very receptive to
single mothers (see 3.3) such that the overall eﬀect on fertility is still to be
discussed.
3.2 Direct cost of having children
Institutions inﬂuence how much parents spend for children and how much is
e.g. paid for by the public, and they can therefore increase or decrease the
utility from having children. Of the long list of cost factors we will focus
here on health, education, and housing because within those there are major
diﬀerences between Germany and Japan.
There is a big diﬀerence in health-related maternity beneﬁts. Whereas
in Japan regular examinations during pregnancy are not covered by health
insurance,5 in Germany they are. Furthermore, children are insured for free
in Germany, whereas in Japan they are often not.
The most important cost component is education. Its importance showed
in a 2004 Japanese survey quoted by Chapple (2004) where 75% of respon-
dents said the top reason for the falling birthrate was the economic burden
involved with having children. In Japan, only 44.3% of costs for pre-primary
education (kindergarden etc) are paid for by the public, whereas in Germany
it is 72.1%. For post-secondary education the diﬀerence is even greater: The
Japanese public pays for only 33.7%, whereas the German one ﬁnances 85.3%.
This does not even account for the tutoring and extra-curricular classes that
most Japanese parents want to provide for their children in order to prepare
them for the entrance examination for one of the elite schools, which in turn
5According to Chapple (2004), each visit costs about 5000 yen (about 50 USD).
15prepare them to enter the elite universities. For many parents, the compet-
itiveness of the educational system and the associated social pressure also
play a part in deciding for or against children. Therefore, if parents believe
they would not be able to aﬀord the full range of educational oﬀers for their
child, they decide to remain childless.
In addition, particularly in Japan, housing costs play an important part as
well. Housing is generally expensive but Hirayama and Izuhara (2008) argue
that women in particular have been disadvantaged in the housing market.
Under Japanese law, the proportion of an individual’s investment in a house
is translated directly to a share of his ownership of the property. Thus, since
men tend to be breadwinners in a family, they are very often sole owners of
the house. In their sample, only 20 percent of married women own a share of
the family home. After divorce, the wife has no rights to the house: whereas
only 28% of men move out after divorce, 71% of women do so. Anticipation
of this loss of wealth in case of a divorce tends to stabilize marriages. Yet,
this ﬁnancial insecurity also aﬀects family decisions by detering women from
entering the marriage market in the ﬁrst place – which would increase the
number of lone mothers or childless women.
The latter might result in another friction that women face in housing:
The rental sector is rather small in Japan (only about a quarter of the housing
stock). In addition, owners often reject female-headed households because
they fear that working single women, whether childless or not, might not have
stable employment. Social norms and lack of acceptance of female-headed
households play a part here as well. But also for married couples not being
able to aﬀord child-adequate housing is often cited as the major reason for
not having children.6 With seniority wages still in place in many ﬁrms it
takes a while until an employee has moved up the corporate ladder enough
to be able to aﬀord a house with garden in the suburb or a spacious city
apartment. Childbearing and often also marriage are delayed until then –
and might not occur at all if things don’t go as planned.
These considerations are not as prevalent in Germany although the trade-
oﬀ between own consumption and child investment has a similarly deterrent
eﬀect for younger women. The question of aﬀordable education is also not an
issue in Germany. On the one hand this is rooted in the already mentioned
fact that schooling is basically publicly ﬁnanced. On the other hand the Ger-
6What exactly child-adequate housing is, is largely socially determined, therefore social
norms are important here as well.
16man education system is – as has been persistently criticized by the OECD
for a long time – not permeable. Thus, parents’ own education characteristics
and not their investments play a major role in children’s educational success.
One major issue in assessing the cost of having children is the reconciliation
of work and family life. Women’s opportunity costs of having children in
terms of foregone earnings are considered as high. Therefore, this issue is
addressed in a paragraph on its own.
All in all, direct costs of having children are lower in Germany than in
Japan. The diﬀerence, however, seems to be mainly driven by quality aspects
that are more important for Japanese parents. They decrease fertility in
general but have only little impact on the ratio between in- and out-of-
wedlock birth rate.
3.3 Characteristics of labor market and tax system
According to neoclassical labor supply theory, individuals choose if and how
many hours they want to work according to their preferences. This, how-
ever, is not possible if major constraints keep them from doing so. In the
case of German and Japanese mothers those are mainly constraints inher-
ent to the labor market, constraints caused by the availability of external
childcare facilities, and constraints through social norms. As the numbers of
working mothers in both countries are comparable and, in addition, rather
low compared to other developed countries,7 it is worthwhile to compare the
situation in both countries.
In 2006, the gap in average hourly wages between men and women in Ger-
many was 28% (Anger and Schmidt 2008), one of the largest gaps within the
EU. Of course, this gap does not only result from direct wage discrimination,
but also from the low percentage of women in management positions (only
about 17% of German managers are women), from diﬀerences in professions
and sectors and from the high percentage of women working part-time. 90%
of working German men work full time, as opposed to only 46% of working
women. Part-time work is particularly common among mothers: According
to Berger (2009) only 18% of mothers of children under 14 work full time
(more than 35 hours a week). 39% don’t participate in the labor force at all.
7According to the OECD in Germany 54.9% of women with children under 16 worked in
2005 and 52.5% of Japanese women in the same situation. With these numbers Germany is
in the bottom third of the European Union where the leading countries have rates around
80%. In North America and Australia these rates are around two thirds.
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about 15%. If one takes into consideration that a considerable part of the
gender wage gap is also because of child related pauses in employment biog-
raphy, the gap shrinks to an estimated 6% for women who go back into work
rapidly after a child-related pause. However, this is mostly not possible in
Germany due to a dramatic shortage of childcare-facilities.
Furthermore, this pattern of female part-time work and long child-related
pauses is supported by the German income tax system. This system is de-
signed such that two (married) couples with the same joint income pay the
same tax, no matter who contributed to which extent to that income. If the
spouses’ individual incomes diﬀer, for instance because one is doing part-
time work, the marginal tax rate on the lower income is a lot higher than it
would be if the person was single. Thus, the incentive to take up a job or to
increase working hours is lower for a married (low-earner) woman than for
an unmarried woman with the same income.
So, if a married mother decides to exit the labor market temporarily to
take care of her children, her incentive to get back in is lower than in other
countries. If one considers that her income prospects might be meager due
to the child-related pause, it becomes likely that she decides to stay at home.
However, her human capital from the employer’s point of view diminishes
with each year she doesn’t participate in the labor market. The lower her
earnings potential is, the greater her dependency on a husband’s earnings and
the lower the probability of divorce. In addition to these obstacles, childcare
facilities are scarce in Germany (see 3.4) which forces many mothers to work
part-time. Yet, it is factually impossible in Germany to pursue a career
and to strive for leading, well-paid positions while working part-time as long
working hours and a high degree of ﬂexibility are expected for these jobs.
Thus, working mothers – be they married or not – are curbed in their career
and income options.
In sum, from a labor-market perspective, the opportunity costs of having
children are considerable for German women.
Women in Japan also face many obstacles as far as their labor-market
opportunities are concerned. Japanese employers often pay beneﬁts for the
spouses of regular workers – given that the spouses don’t work themselves.
Furthermore, the Japanese system discourages dependent spouses from earn-
ing more than 1.3 million Yen per year (that is about 31% of the earnings of
an average production worker) as above this level spouses generally have to
pay health and pension contributions. Therefore, although everyone is taxed
18individually in Japan, incentives to work during marriage are diminished
signiﬁcantly through institutions as well. In 2005, only 56.6% of Japanese
married women between 15 and 64 participated in the labor force. In the
age group of 30 to 34 only 48.1% of married women work, whereas 83.7% of
unmarried women do. Therefore, Japanese women often depend on a hus-
band’s earnings. This makes divorce less attractive. On the other hand,
women whose opportunity costs are high are reluctant to accept the “mar-
riage package” and decide against entering the marriage market in the ﬁrst
place.
Moreover, a seniority-based remuneration system makes it extremely hard
for women to re-enter their job after a child-related pause. It is often only
possible to re-enter low-paying non-regular employment.8 Accordingly, more
than 85% of men in work have regular contracts, compared with about 55%
of women. Half of lone-parents are in low-paid non-regular work. Yet even
for full-time regular workers the gender wage gap is 35%.
All in all, stepping out of employment to have children and then coming
back is very costly. In 1993, the Japanese Economic Planing Agency esti-
mated that of two college graduated women, one of whom continues full-time
jobs until she is 60 and the other one steps out of employment for 5 years to
take care of her children and then re-enters into part-time work until she is
60, the latter earns 78% less life time income than the former. Under these
conditions, the opportunity costs of having children are even higher than in
Germany.
However, ever-changing markets, new competitors from emerging economies
and rapidly evolving technologies require a more ﬂexible response by Japanese
companies. Jacoby (2004) argues that the “three pillar system” of Japanese
capitalism which is said to consist of lifetime employment, enterprise unions
and seniority-based pay, is gradually being diluted. For young, well-educated
women this may imply new career opportunities, circumventing the old male
dominated corporate ladder. However, this will require considerable sacriﬁce
in terms of long work hours and transferability. For this type of woman,
remaining childless might not only be the most attractive, but possibly also
the only feasible option.
8The distinction between regular and non-regular work is a particularity of the Japanese
labor market that denotes a two-tier system of workers with diﬀering lay-oﬀ rules and other
labor-market-related rights.
193.4 Balancing work and family life: Childcare facilities
In Japan, a possible connection between the ease of reconciling work and
family life and the birth rate has been subject of public debate for quite a
while and has lead to the – announced with great fanfare but all in all rather
eﬀectless – implementation of the “Angel Plan” in 1994 and its revision in
1999. The purpose of the public policy plan was to oﬀer more counseling ser-
vices for parents, more public childcare facilities and encouraging attitudinal
change towards working mothers in companies.
However, most of these initiatives became stuck in the sand, argues Chap-
ple (2004), because the local governments, which were in charge of imple-
menting them, could not ﬁnance them. The “Plus One Proposal”, though
more ambitious – the funds for the construction of 50,000 new day-care cen-
ters are included in the plan – is likely to suﬀer a similar fate (Bonnett
(2009)). However, putting part of it into law through the amendment of
the Child Welfare Law in 2003 was an important step to render the cor-
nucopia of well-meaning plans to increase the number of childcare facilities
more binding. This amendment enabled local governments and non-proﬁt
organizations to establish after-school-hours care centers, whose number has
increased since then.
Therefore, the number of day-care slots seems -more or less- to match
the demand. However, many child-care centers and kindergardens still don’t
open until late. Combined with the above mentioned need to work long hours
if one wants to pursue a career, the supply is not suﬃcient for mothers to be
able to work.
Childcare facilities are nevertheless more easily available in Japan, where
according to OECD statistics 18% of children up to the age of two are enrolled
in childcare centers, than in Germany, where only 13% of children under
three years of age attend a childcare center. In a survey quoted by Anger
and Schmidt (2008), 35% of German parents of children under three years of
age said they would enroll their child in childcare if they had the opportunity.
Wrohlich (2005) ﬁnds that more than 50% of children aged zero to three years
and 10% of children aged four to six years are queuing for a childcare place.
Berger (2009) argues that a major reason for the short supply of childcare
for small children is due to an over-regulated market: municipalities decide on
funding and market entrance, so that for-proﬁt providers almost never enter
the market. Furthermore, since the supply of childcare is publicly funded
and not demand-driven there are no incentives to adjust opening hours to
20parental preferences.
German law states a right for every child to be enrolled in kindergarden
(childcare for children aged three to six), however, many kindergardens only
oﬀer part-time care and therefore don’t enable mothers to work. Neither do
schools: In Germany most schools end around noon, discharging the children
again into their mother’s care. Lack of childcare facilities often means that
mothers can’t work the desired number of hours: 44% of mothers said in a
2008 survey by the Forsa Institute that they would like to work or work more
hours if the current availability of childcare facilities permitted this.
Berger (2009) uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel and ﬁnds
that periods of part-time work or non-participation have a signiﬁcant neg-
ative eﬀect on mothers’ subjective well-being beyond the eﬀect of foregone
earnings. She concludes that women don’t step out of the labor force volun-
tarily but have no choice, mainly due to lack of childcare facilities. However,
she also notes a decrease over the years in mothers not able to take up em-
ployment.
To sum up, in Germany as well as in Japan, it is hard to reconcile work
and family life, although there has been some recent additional public fund-
ing of childcare in both countries. Available and aﬀordable childcare facilities
decrease the opportunity costs of motherhood and release mother’s time con-
straint, whether married or not. Therefore they increase fertility if women
want to work. All in all, the perceived scarcity is more pronounced in Ger-
many.
3.5 Balancing work and family life: Parental leave
The term ”maternal leave” is used for shorter leave periods right after birth
and guarantees reemployment and mostly also continuation of wage pay-
ments. Parental leave in general is an extended time period of several months
during which the leave taker is also guaranteed reemployment. However, he
or she is not always paid a wage. Maternal leave duration in Germany and
Japan is similar, the payments diﬀer. As parental leave regulations cover
a longer time period, they are likely to have a larger impact on a woman’s
decision on motherhood and on having a break in her work life. Therefore,
the analysis to follow concentrates on the more general parental leave.
Since 2007, German parents have been entitled to a new kind of child
credit, worth 67% of former wage income, which is paid for 12 months if a
parent stays at home after a child is born. This period is extended to 14
21months if also the other parent takes at least two months of leave. Unpaid
leave can be taken for a total period of three years for both parents. However,
the duration of paid parental leave has been reduced from a maximum of 24
months to a maximum of 14 months in order to encourage mothers to return
to employment more quickly. It is possible to work part-time during leave
period, which helps mitigate the human capital loss through an employment
pause.
Legally, Japanese parents have been entitled to one year of parental leave
with 40% of the salary being paid through social insurance during the leave
and re-employment guaranteed. However, Imamura (2004) argues that few
take the whole leave period because they fear to be transferred to a position
with lower responsibilities or made redundant altogether. Furthermore, leave
is only available to workers in regular employment, which many women are
not. In addition, Japanese parents of young children have the right to not
work over-time for more than 24 hours a month or 150 hours a year. They are
also entitled to a more ﬂexible work schedule. However, considering Japanese
culture and work ethics it is very doubtful that these laws are often enforced.
Although both German and Japanese parental-leave regulation addresses
mothers as well as fathers, the German entitlement for fathers and for shared
parental leave is independent from marital status. In June 2010 an important
change to parental leave regulation took eﬀect: much like in the German
case it is now possible to share parental leave, and the leave period will be
extended to 14 months if both parents participate (The Mainichi Daily News,
June 25, 2010). This new policy initiative again shows public awareness of
the diﬃculty of balancing work and family life in Japan. However, also
here, the new law will have little eﬀect if work ethics, which still require full
commitment to job and ﬁrm, are not prone to change.
According to Anger and Schmidt (2008) German fathers brought forward
10.5% of all motions for parental leave in Germany in 2007 – whereas most
of them only took the minimum duration of two months. In Japan, only 1%
of fathers take paternal leave (Imamura (2004)).
Fathers who contribute to their children’s education and who are willing
to invest resources, especially time, increase the utility from marriage. Fur-
thermore, the mother’s direct costs in terms of time decrease if the father
helps her out, increasing the utility from having children. Thus, the German
institution and possibly the new Japanese one will slightly increase women’s
willingness to become mothers independent of marital status.
223.6 Family law
In Germany, the child-support and child-related alimony law was reformed
in 2007. Before that, divorced mothers received child-related alimony for
much longer (until the child was at least eight years old) than never married
mothers (only until the child was three). Since the 2007 reform, all mothers
receive alimony only until the child is three.9
The new law was created to enhance incentives for divorced men to marry
again because they do not have to spend as much money on their ﬁrst family
anymore. However, for women the situation is diﬀerent: The new law de-
creases the utility from marriage from the female perspective, since it does
not make a diﬀerence in terms of own consumption whether a mother is never
married or divorced. This decrease in utility from marriage is aggravated by
the fact that scarcer day-care places (see 3.4) are more likely to be given to
working lone mothers than to wives – which makes it more diﬃcult for the
latter to work. Therefore, the expected decrease in human capital and, thus,
future income is bigger for married than for unmarried mothers. In conse-
quence, a working woman who wants to have children is under the current
German legislation better oﬀ if unmarried.
In Japan, court assigned child support is generally low. Few women
are entitled to child support at all. However, payment is seldom enforced
and therefore basically voluntary. Married women cannot expect much child
support after divorce, and for unmarried women, the rules for visitation and
ﬁnancial support are even less clear. Thus, marriage is not a reliable income
source as long as divorce is a likely event – which was not the case in Japan
but is now changing (see 3.7). Therefore, the current situation concerning
payments is similar in Germany and Japan – albeit for diﬀerent reasons:
Financial support for the mother from the father in case of a separation is
not a reliable income source.
Diﬀerences are bigger in terms of custody legislation: If German parents
are not married, the default is that the mother has sole custody. Yet, she can
share custody with the father – an act that cannot easily be undone. Shared
custody after divorce is also possible and has turned to be the default option.
In any case, both never-married and divorced parents have the right and duty
to spend time with their child.
Shared custody can increase the utility from single motherhood because
9Payments to support the child itself have not been subject to change and have to be
paid at least until the child is 18.
23costs in terms of time can be shared and because custodial fathers are more
likely to invest in their children because they can observe better the out-
come of their investment. Shared custody is therefore a way of combining
the beneﬁts of marriage (shared costs of childrearing in terms of time and
money) and the beneﬁts of single motherhood (private-good character of the
child). Therefore, women considering divorce are more likely to actually get
divorced, and women considering out-of-wedlock pregnancy are more likely to
fulﬁll their wish for children, increasing the incidence of single motherhood.
By contrast, there is no shared child custody in Japan. Visitation rights
are sometimes granted, but hardly ever enforced. Theoretically, one can
imagine that mother and father can agree on a positive amount of child
support if the mother is willing to trade it for time spent with the child, i.e.,
visitation rights. Anecdotic reference says that this indeed happens a lot in
Japan. Nevertheless, the custodial parent has to incur higher costs in terms
of time and probably money than in Germany, decreasing the utility from
single motherhood.
3.7 Social norms
As Fernandez (2007) and Fernandez and Fogli (2009) have shown, individual
adaptation to institutions diﬀer according to cultural values an individual has
internalized. The eﬀect is particularly strong with respect to social norms
aﬀecting family life and – in our context – labor-market decisions. From
sociology and psychology it is known that internalized social norms are driven
by long-term cultural factors as well as – as economists would call them –
short-term institutions. In what follows we will address this correspondence
between institutions and social norms.
The Japanese society is rooted in confucianism, from which it derives the
importance of patriarchal family structures (Atoh et al. (2004)). Therefore,
lone motherhood is socially still not very accepted as an alternative family
model. Social constraints are thus one of the major reasons the rate of
single mothers is still lower in Japan than in many other developed countries.
However, traditional nuclear families have already lost the huge prevalence
they once had; the parasite-single phenomenon and older women divorcing
their husbands due to a reform that grants them a larger portion of their
husband’s pension are obvious examples of this. Therefore, in particular if
we account for the labor-market aspects we have addressed in the sections
before, we expect this tendency of erosion of traditional structure to soon
24aﬀect single motherhood as well.
There has been a lot of commentary on the changing features of Japanese
marriage markets. All in all, much more women remain unmarried than in
the past, both because they decide not to enter the marriage market in the
ﬁrst place, and because they don’t ﬁnd a partner when they do enter the
marriage market. This is especially the case for highly educated women.
These are independent of a husband’s earnings, but they are also used to a
high standard of living they can aﬀord because of their own education and
job. If they marry they know they might have to work part-time with the
well-known labor-market consequences of signiﬁcantly decreased wages and
future labor market and career opportunities (Raymo and Iwasawa 2005).
Furthermore, many husbands still expect their wives to stay at home and
take care of household and children, so women used to having a career of
their own opt against the “marriage package” if they can aﬀord to live on
their own.
Tsuya et al. (2005) found that indeed men do very little housework: Wives
in general did 90.5% of the housework, where even among employed wives
the wife’s share of a couple’s housework was 90.1%. The diﬀerence of hours
spent on housework between employed and not employed women is even
becoming smaller. Women who want to pursue their career mostly have to
shoulder the burden of housework in addition to their job responsibilities,
resulting in extremely long work hours for employed women. In 2000, the
combined workload (market and household work) of employed wives was
73 weekly hours which was more than double the workload (just household
work) of non-working wives, at 34 weekly hours. Childcare time is not even
considered here.
Raymo and Iwasawa (2005) ﬁnd that the decline in marriage rates has
been most pronounced among highly educated women. They conclude: ”(t)he
association between women’s educational attainment and marriage is most
likely to be negative when relative improvements in women’s economic oppor-
tunities are not accompanied by convergence in men’s and women’s economic
roles within the family” (p. 802). So, marrying is not an attractive option for
highly educated women. In addition, long university enrollment delays entry
into the marriage market as well. At that point the ﬁrst marriage market
round is over, and they stay single or marry after their childbearing age is
over.
Retherford et al. (2001) argue that another reason for marriage market
mismatch is that Japanese men still seem to prefer to marry less educated
25women and women prefer to marry higher-educated men. This might be
because – due to institutions of the labor market that hinder women’s reen-
try and career opportunities – men still have the role of primary economic
providers and therefore there is competition for economically “attractive”
men. With more women obtaining university degrees, more highly educated
women remain single due to a decline in the relative supply of equally well
educated men. In more egalitarian societies like Sweden or the US women’s
economic resources are positively or insigniﬁcantly related to marriage, but
negatively in Japan.
In Germany, major changes in the labor market as they happen in Japan
today have taken place some decades ago. The ﬁrst step was that equal
rights – which had already been granted by the 1949 constitution – were im-
plemented by the civil code in the late 1950s. From that day onwards women
were entitled to sign their own employment contracts10. In addition, the eco-
nomic boom in the 50s and 60s increased the demand for workers (which
was, however, not completely met by German women but by guestworkers
due to reasons that are outside the scope of this paper) such that women
became able to ﬁnance their own living. In consequence, lone motherhood
and cohabitation, which were socially and legally sanctioned11 developed into
options that now enjoy equal treatment if not special support from society.
Yet, in Germany as well as in Japan women are kept on track by social
norms. For instance, the view that mothers and not educated childcare
workers should take full-time care of children is still widespread. The German
pejorative term “raven mother” refers to mothers who spend “too little” time
with their children, due to work or other commitments. The role of a working
mother with career prospects is still connected with ambiguous feelings in
Germany. In a survey by the Forsa-Institute, 70% of women claim that they
are the primary caregivers for their children, regardless of whether they work
or not. In 27% of cases, mothers state that both she and her husband take
care of the children and only in 2% of cases the father is the primary caregiver.
However, in the same survey, when asked which division of labor in a family
they would ﬁnd ideal “in principle”, 62% of parents (60% of men and 64%
of women) stated that both parents should work and take part in raising
the children. This indicates that the traditional division of labor in most
10Although a ”male cartel” between employers and husbands did not immediately follow
suit in applying the new rules.
11Until 1969 an unmarried father was legally not even considered kin of his biological
children and children born out of wedlock automatically got a legal guardian.
26German families is not only due to social norms, which are slowly changing,
but also to other constraints, such as lack of childcare facilities.
Yet, increased provision of childcare facilities and the increased (and
legally supported) uptake of parental leave by German fathers reveal a begin-
ning change not only in preconceived gender roles but also in an adaptation of
the institutional setup. Given the labor-market institutions we have already
addressed such a new balance is likely to eventually increase fertility.
The situation in Japan shows a similar change in gender roles. Using the
Japanese General Social Surveys 2000-2003, Kawaguchi and Miyazaki (2009)
ﬁnd that 55% of men agree with the statement “If a husband has suﬃcient
income, his wife should not work.” However: Men raised by full-time working
mothers were 6 percentage points less likely to agree with the statement than
those raised by not fully employed mothers – which is perfectly in line with
Fernandez (2007). Thus, with more women entering the labor force, public
perception of what is appropriate will change step by step. However, in Japan
there is still a much longer path ahead.
4 Conclusion
So, which institutions seem to be most decisive in determining women’s joint
marriage and fertility decision? We found that those institutions that are
crucial in widening or narrowing women’s set of attractive choices are able
to tell us which path women are likely to choose. In particular, these seem
to be institutions that facilitate or exacerbate the reconciliation of work and
family life, such as the availability of childcare facilities, and institutions
which aﬀect the aﬀordability of life as a single mother. As far as the ﬁrst
aspect is concerned, in both Japan and Germany it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd an
adequate work-life balance. Therefore, many well educated women decide in
favor of childlessness.
Being a single mother is more easily aﬀordable and more socially accepted
in Germany than in Japan: social welfare is higher and child support is
enforceable, albeit not as reliable a payment as it used to be. Women have
in most cases become independent of a husband’s earnings, and divorce is
very common. Accordingly, the percentage of single – never married and
divorced – mothers is much higher in Germany.
In Japan, labor market institutions, mainly seniority, are in a process of
loosening and yield opportunities for women to become independent of a hus-
27band’s earnings. The aﬀordability of being a single mother is not very likely
to increase soon – living of social welfare is hardly an attractive option and
direct costs of children often remain too high for a single person to aﬀord.
However, there is a group of women for whom becoming a single mother
might become an attractive option: “parasite singles” who live with their
parents and have suﬃcient earnings of their own. Thus, we can conclude
that women’s decision on marriage and fertility are connected to a diﬀerent
extent in both countries. In Japan women seem to consider marriage and
children as strict complements and decide either in favor or against the “mar-
riage package”. Attractiveness of one or the other option is determined by
institutions of the tax system and labor market. The current development
increases labor-market opportunities of women – as long as they are unmar-
ried and childless. Japanese women thus beneﬁt from a more ﬂexible labor
market, but without deeper changes in aﬀordability of children and gender
roles within marriage change is not likely to come fast.
In Germany, new interpretations of the constitution have loosened the
connection between marriage and motherhood. Thus, women may decide on
having children but against being married. Yet, lacking availability of child-
care makes motherhood an expensive option, in particular for middle earners
who cannot aﬀord private solutions. Nevertheless, there are some signs of
a slow reversal of the trend of falling birth rates as the number of childcare
places is increasing and there are reliable signals that this increase will per-
sist even under the budgetary cuts the German public sector has to face. In
addition, a growing awareness of the needs of lone mothers has changed social
norms such that lone motherhood is now a generally accepted option. How-
ever, connected to the rising number of one-parent families, another question
is moving into the center of interest. How can policy initiatives foster the
stability of two-parent families? Policy means to stabilize marriage and/or
cohabitation seem to fail persistently with so far unknown consequences for
the next generation.
Since it became socially acceptable in Germany to be a single mother
many women have followed this track. With respect to the future of mar-
riage and motherhood we can therefore conclude that fertility rates in Ger-
many might have reached the bottom where an increase of the numbers is to
be expected if formal and informal institutions move away from the “raven
mother”. Marriage will certainly further loose its importance. If politicians
ﬁnd prudent institutions they might be able to stabilize cohabitation and,
in consequence, dependable conditions for children. The current institutions
28are not likely to provide incentives for such long-standing relationships.
From our considerations a diﬀerent development is likely for Japan. Here,
motherhood and marriage are still highly connected and as a package rather
unattractive for highly educated women. Thus, if institutions do not change
quickly, fertility rates in Japan will further drop.
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